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THE ADJUDICATION OF GENOCIDE:
GACACA AND THE ROAD TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA
MAYA SOSNOV 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Rwanda suffered one of the worst genocides in history. During 100
days of killing, 800,000 people died.2 More people died in three months than in
over four years of conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, the speed of killing was five
times faster than the Nazi execution of the Final Solution.3 Unlike the killings that
occurred during the Holocaust, Rwandans engaged in "a populist genocide," in
which many members of society, including children, participated in killing their
neighbors with common farm tools (the most popular was the machete). 4 While
not all Hutus engaged in killing and not all victims were Tutsi, Hums executed the
vast majority of the killings and Tutsis were largely the target of their aggression. 5
Fourteen years after the genocide, Rwanda is still struggling with how to
rebuild the country and handle the mass atrocities that occurred. During the first
four years following the genocide, four types of courts developed to prosecute
genocidaires: 6 the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, foreign courts
exercising universal jurisdiction, domestic criminal courts, and a domestic military
tribunal. Regrettably, none of these courts has been able to resolve the enormous
problems related to adjudicating genocide suspects. In 2001, the government
created gacaca, a fifth system for prosecuting genocidaires, to solve the problems it
saw in the other courts. Gacaca is highly lauded by the government and many
outside observers as the solution to Rwanda's genocide. A researcher, who studied
two gacaca pilot programs for five months, noted that "[t]he official discourse is so
1. Maya Sosnov received her J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. She is
currently clerking for the Honorable Anita B. Brody of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The author would like to thank Philip Keitel and Leonard Sosnov for their
valuable comments and suggestions.
2. HOwARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
EXPERIENCE 156 (University Press of Kansas 1999).
3. Id. at 164, 166.
4. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355,361-63 (2002).
5. Id. at 365.
6. A term generally used to refer to perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide. See, e.g., YVES
BEIGBEDER, JUDGING CRIMINAL LEADERS: THE SLOW EROSION OF IMPUNITY 102 (Martinus Nijhoff
2002).
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passionate about gacaca and its anticipated outcome that the system is almost
granted a mythical status." 7
Unfortunately, gacaca cannot fully operate as either a court or a customary
dispute resolution mechanism because of its twin goals: retribution and
reconciliation. Moreover, Rwanda's limited resources and the astounding number
of suspects require enormous revisions to gacaca. This paper explores why
Rwanda implemented gacaca, the reasons for gacaca's failure and possible
solutions for moving forward. Part I presents an overview of the history of ethnic
tension in Rwanda, the events leading up to genocide, and the genocide itself. Part
II examines the four courts created before gacaca to adjudicate genocide, their
failures in the eyes of the Rwandan government and international observers, and
the government's creation of gacaca. Part III explores the goals of the Rwandan
gacaca model, and whether they are attainable or desirable. Part IV examines
gacaca courts' failure to implement criminal procedure protections. Part V
suggests revisions to the current adjudication of genocide suspects, including an
alternative model of gacaca. Additionally, this section highlights the importance
of addressing Rwandans' economic struggles, as a necessary element of
reconciliation. Part VI concludes the article.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RWANDA
Disagreement among Rwandans on critical aspects of the nation's history
continues to be a major impediment to reconciliation. The Organization of African
Unity remarks that "there are hardly any important aspects of the story that are not
complex and controversial; it is almost impossible to write on the subject without
inadvertently oversimplifying something or angering someone."8 One of the most
controversial issues is the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda. 9  Before the
genocide, the ethnic make-up of Rwanda was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1%
Twa.10 Although these ethnicities were clearly defined, it is unclear how they
developed." Since the end of genocide, the government has promoted a version of
history in which Tutsi and Hutu peacefully co-existed before colonialism. 12 The
government's official website claims that "[w]hile the relationship between the
king and the rest of the population was unequal, the relationship between the
ordinary Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa1 3 was one of mutual benefit mainly through
7. Arthur Molenaar, Gacaca: Grassroots Justice After Genocide. The Key to Reconciliation in
Rwanda?, 77 AFR. STUD. CENTER RES. REP. 1, 68 (2005), available at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/bitstream/1887/4645/1/ASC- 1236144-071 .pdf.
8. Daly, supra note 4, at 358 (quoting AFRICAN UNION, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE
- INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES 2.1 (2000), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/Officialdocuments/reports/Report-rowanda-genocide.pdf).
9. Id. at 359.
10. BALL, supra note 2, at 156.
11. Daly, supra note 4, at 359-60.
12. Id. at 359.
13. Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa are the terms traditionally used by Rwandans to identify the ethnic
groups within their country. These terms, when adopted by the West, became Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and
refer to the same ethnic groups. See, e.g., WOMEN FOR WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA FACTSHEET
(2005), http://www.womenforwomen.org/downloads/country-factsheet-rwanda-sunday.pdf.
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the exchange of their labour. The relationship was symbiotic."' 14 However, many
Hutus believe that Tutsi herders were foreigners to Rwanda who considered
themselves superior to the Hutu pastoralists and took control of the region between
the eleventh and fifteenth century. 5  The failure of the Tutsi-controlled
government to address the Hutu version of history further highlights the significant
ideological split between Tutsis and Hums. Hutus and Tutsis view themselves as
different ethnic groups, even though they share the same language (Kinyarwanda),
culture, clan names, customs, taboos, and have intermarried for centuries. 16 The
government has avoided confronting these conflicting beliefs between ethnic
groups and has banned the use of ethnic categories because it is afraid of inflaming
ethnic tensions. 17 However, the government's lack of healthy outlets in society for
Rwandans to face these differences and resolve them has forced these tensions to
erupt in courtrooms and gacaca. Since 1994, no history lessons have been taught
in Rwandan schools because no consensus exists on the past, and government
publications refuse to include an ethnic breakdown of society.'
8
Whether or not the ethnic divisions began in pre-colonial times, they were
exploited during colonialism. Colonists considered Tutsis to be the missing link
between blacks and whites because many Tutsi were lighter skinned, thinner, and
taller than the Hums.19 As a result, Tutsis were placed in positions of authority
over Hums. In 1935, Belgian colonists introduced ethnic identity cards ("tribal
cards") to Rwandans.2 ° Ironically, these cards provided the lists of Tutsis to be
targeted for killing during the genocide.2' Prior to the introduction of identity
cards, Hutus could become Tutsis with the acquisition of cattle; however, ethnic
identity cards ended this practice. 22 For the majority of the colonial period, up
until 1959, Tutsis dominated local government and the educational arena.23  In
1959, Hutus forcibly took power following the death of the Tutsi monarch, killing
Tutsis and forcing many others into exile.24 By 1962, when Belgium granted
independence to Rwanda, Hutus controlled the government and more than 200,000
Tutsis were in exile.25
Since independence, there have been several power struggles between Hutus
and Tutsis, including a series of massacres that occurred in 1963, 1964, 1973,
14. Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda: History, http://www.gov.rw/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2007).
15. Daly, supra note 4, at 360.
16. BALL, supra note 2, at 156; Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative
Dispute Resolution Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 8 (2005).
17. Marian Hodgkin, Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State, 60(1) J. INT'L
AFF. 199, 202, 207 (2006).
18. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 41, 48
(2004).
19. Raper, supra note 16, at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7, 9.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 9-10.
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1990, 1992, and 1993.26 In August 1993, Hutus and Tutsis signed the Arusha
Peace Accord and appeared to reach a power sharing agreement. 27  The United
Nations (UN) Security Council sent 2,500 UN troops to Rwanda to monitor the
treaty. 8 Although peace seemed near to the outside world, as early as January
1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, UN commander in Rwanda, notified the UN
that the Hutu government planned to exterminate the Tutsis.29 On April 6, 1994,
the airplane of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was shot down and
genocide began within the hour. 30 Rather than increasing the number of soldiers,
as requested by Major General Dallaire, the UN withdrew troops, leaving 270 UN
soldiers in Rwanda under a mandate only to "monitor" the situation. 3' Over the
next three months 800,000 people died in the genocide.
3 2
II. A RWANDAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE FOUR COURTS ESTABLISHED TO ADJUDICATE
GENOCIDE
A. The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR)
Shortly after the genocide, the Rwandan govermnent requested the help of the
UN to form an international tribunal to prosecute genocide suspects because there
were hardly any lawyers or judges in the country.33 In November 1994, the UN
Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).34
The UN based its authority to create the ICTR on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
35
The ICTR has the power to "prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring
states.",36  The jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to individuals 37 suspected of
committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3
26. Raper, supra note 16, at 13.
27. BALL, supra note 2, at 162.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 163.
30. Id. President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by two ground-to-air-missiles. There are
two competing theories of responsibility for the plane crash. One version is that radicals within
Habyarimana's regime shot the president's plane down because they were unhappy with a peace
agreement that would give rebels a stake in the government. Id. Alternatively, others claim that Paul
Kagame and other Tutsi rebels shot the president's plane down because they knew that the power
sharing agreement that called for multiparty elections would not place Tutsis in power since they were
only fifteen percent of the population. In November 2006, this theory was supported by French Judge
Jean Louis Bruguiere who accused Paul Kagame of participating in the assassination of Habyarimana.
Stephen Kinzer, The France-Rwanda Affaire, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at Bus. Sec.,
available at 2006 WLNR 21960974; The Heat Turns on Kagame, THIS DAY (Nigeria), Nov. 26, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 20647387.
31. BALL, supra note 2, at 163-64.
32. Id. at 155-56.
33. Id. at 171, 183. The dearth of lawyers and judges is attributable to the deaths of many of these
practitioners and the destruction of their offices and supplies during the genocide.
34. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 104.
35. JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 465 (2d ed. 2000).
36. Id. at 474 (quoting Article I of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
37. The ICTR doesn't have jurisdiction over groups or organizations. See id. at 500.
VOL. 36:2
THE ADJUDICATION OF GENOCIDE
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.38 Although the
Rwandan government initially supported formation of the international tribunal,
Rwanda was the only member of the UN Security Council to vote against the
ICTR.39
There are several reasons why Rwanda voted against the ICTR. One of its
main objections was the ICTR's lack of a death penalty.40 The Rwandan
government feared that the masterminds of the genocide would receive prison
terms, while subordinates and lower-ranked perpetrators, found guilty in national
court, would receive the death penalty.4 ' Second, the government was not in favor
of the limited temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal to handle incidents that occurred
between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.42 The Rwandan government
was unhappy with the ICTR's time frame because genocide planning began in
1990.43 Third, the government wanted the ICTR to have the power to prosecute
groups and organizations responsible for promulgating the genocide, rather than its
limited ability to prosecute only "natural persons."4  Lastly, the government felt
strongly that the ICTR should be located within Rwanda, rather than in Arusha,
Tanzania.
In April 1998, Rwanda issued a formal position paper to the UN entitled The
Position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 4 The government criticized the ICTR for
poor organization, personnel problems, lack of a prosecutorial and investigation
strategy, poor conduct in investigations (failure to investigate some of the areas
where the worst atrocities were committed), and poor prosecutorial conduct.47 In
conclusion, the Rwandan government requested implementation of the following
recommendations: (1) an independent prosecutor for Rwanda; 4s (2) moving the
ICTR to Kigali, Rwanda; (3) strengthening the power of the prosecutorial staff; (4)
hiring more qualified staff; and (5) improving cooperation between the ICTR and
38. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 105.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. BALL, supra note 2, at 171-72.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 172.
45. Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? PROCEEDINGS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW, AUSTIN, TEXAS:
NOvEMBER 6-7, 2003 33, 35
(Steven R. Ratner and James L. Bischoff eds., 2004).
46. BALL, supra note 2, at 172.
47. Id. at 172-73.
48. Before September 15, 2003, the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) shared a prosecutor. See Press Release, ICTR, The New Prosecutor of the ICTR Mr. Jallow
Takes Up His Mandate (Oct. 6, 2003) available at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/news-archive/03/03Oct/ICTR_100603.htm.
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the Rwandan government.49 The UN Security Council did not comply with any of
these requests.5 °
Many Rwandans remain unaware of the ICTR because of its distance from
Rwanda and its limited impact on everyday citizens,51 but for those Rwandans who
are familiar with the tribunal, the relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda
remains strained. Martin Ngoga, Rwanda's Deputy Attorney General and
representative to the ICTR for four years, echoes a common belief of many
Rwandans that "[t]he tribunal was not created to get justice, but to nurse the guilt
of the international community."5 2 Additionally, Rwandans have come to see the
ICTR as a drain on international resources that could be better used within the
country.
53
By September 2004, the ICTR had resolved only twenty-three cases, even
though investigations had begun ten years earlier.54 Over two years later, in
December 2006, the ICTR had convicted twenty-six people and acquitted five
people. It was estimated that the ICTR would spend over 1 billion dollars
prosecuting approximately forty genocidaires in the period from 1995 through
2007.56 However, by the end of 2007, only 35 accused had been tried.57
In addition to the limited number of people prosecuted, the UN has planned
for the ICTR to complete its mandate by the end of 2008. This completion
strategy has led the ICTR to begin the process of transferring some of its cases to
the national courts of several countries, including Rwanda. 9 This decision is
49. BALL, supra note 2, at 173.
50. Id.
51. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHio N.U. L. REv. 41,
47 (2005).
52. Dele Olojede, A People's Court, NEWSDAY, May 4, 2004,
http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2005/international-reporting/works/olojede7.html.
53. Gerald Gahima, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, stated that if Rwanda had 1/20 of
the money given to the ICTR, many of Rwanda's problems would be solved. See BEIGBEDER, supra
note 6, at 104.
54. Raper, supra note 16, at 27.
55. Andrew England, FT Report-Rwanda: Putting Faith in the Young. Reconciliation: The Next
Generation Need to Be Brought Up As Agents of Peace, FINANCIAL TIMEs (London), at 5, Dec. 5, 2006.
56. Id.
57. Hirondelle News Agency, ICTR Review- Tough Year Ahead for ICTR as Completion Strategy
Approaches, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/English?OpenFrameSet
58. Id.
59. Id. Several human rights groups oppose the transfer of ICTR cases to Rwanda, even though
Rwanda has abolished the death penalty, which was one of the initial objections people had to
adjudicating cases in Rwanda. Amnesty International urged the ICTR not to transfer cases to Rwanda
until it has demonstrated that: (1) "the Rwandan justice system can operate impartially by investigating
and prosecuting crimes by all sides;" (2) "the Rwanda justice system will conduct trials in accordance
with international fair trial standards;" (3) "trials of any person transferred to Rwanda [will] be
observed by independent experts to ensure that they are fair;" (4) "persons transferred to Rwanda for
trial are not at risk of torture or subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;" and (5)
"[v]ictims and witnesses [will] receive protection and support." Amnesty Int'l, Rwanda: Suspects Must
Not be Transferred to Rwandan Courts for Trial Until it is Demonstrated that Trials will Comply with
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somewhat surprising because the UN created the ICTR based on the premise that
an international tribunal outside of Rwanda was the best method for adjudicating
the worst perpetrators of genocide. 60  Additionally, this decision possesses an
element of irony because, when the ICTR began, the Rwandan government's
request to prosecute these cases in Rwanda was denied.
The majority of Rwandans are dissatisfied with the tribunal because it is slow
and expensive, it provides perpetrators of genocide more rights and amenities than
victims (i.e. comfortable living space and anti-retroviral drugs for HIV infection),
and it remains removed and out of reach for local Rwandans.6'
B. Domestic Criminal Courts
In response to the ICTR's limited temporal and subject matter jurisdiction, as
well as to the slow speed of the ICTR, Rwanda passed Organic Law No. 08/96 of
August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecution for Offences Constituting the
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1,
1990. The law enables Rwanda's criminal courts to prosecute all individuals who
committed genocide, crimes against humanity, or crimes associated with them.62
Unlike the ICTR, people may be prosecuted in domestic courts for crimes
committed between October 1, 1990 and 1994.63 Organic Law No. 08/96, before
its amendment in 2004 (due to the introduction of a new gacaca law), classified
suspects into four categories: (1) leaders and organizers of the genocide, notorious
murderers, and those who committed sexual torture; (2) all others responsible for
"intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death"; (3)
persons who committed serious assaults, but did not kill anyone; and (4) persons
who committed property damage.64 Ironically, the ICTR limits the power of the
national court because it possesses superseding jurisdiction.65 This limitation may
prevent Rwanda from trying some Category 1 suspects because a person
prosecuted by the ICTR may not be tried before a national court for the same
violations of international law. 66 Although the domestic court answers several
critiques the Rwandan government had of the ICTR, the biggest obstacle to the
national court system has been the slow speed of trials. The Rwandan government
acknowledges that:
International Standards of Justice, Al Index AFR 47/013/2007, Nov. 2, 2007.
60. Jason Strain and Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aftermath of Rwanda's Genocide, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 87, 98-99 (Jane
Stromseth ed., 2003).
61. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 46-48.
62. Organic Law No. 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecution for Offences constituting the
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990,, Aug. 30, 1996, art.
1, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm.
63. Id.
64. Id. at Art. II.
65. JONES, supra note 35, at 502 (referencing Article 8 Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
66. Id. at 504 (quoting Article 9 Non-bis-in-idem of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda).
2008
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
[T]he sheer bulk of genocide suspects and cases due for trial has placed
severe strain on Rwanda's criminal justice system which is already
crippled by poor infrastructure and the death of professionals during the
genocide. Rwanda's prisons are heavily congested, and the cost of
feeding and clothing prisoners is a drain on the economy.
67
Additionally, the government estimates that it would take 200 years, at the
present rate, to prosecute everyone in the traditional court system.68 As of January
2002, only 1,989 suspects had been brought to trial, 69 and a year and a half later, in
August 2003, only 6,500 people had been tried.70 Considering that over 135,000
suspects had been detained in prisons, these numbers were very low. 71  This
prosecutorial lethargy was attributable to the judicial system's devastation during
genocide, including the departure or death of most lawyers, judges, and judicial
personnel and the destruction of offices, supplies and transportation. 72 Moreover,
the slow speed of the criminal courts had created horribly overcrowded prisons.73
Prior to 1994, detention facilities had a limited capacity to hold only 18,000
people.74 Since the end of genocide, new prisons have been built, and old ones
expanded, but they have only increased prison holding capacity to 51,000 people.75
In a country greatly depleted of financial resources and in need of massive physical
rebuilding, the imprisonment of such a large percentage of the population is a
tremendous burden economically, socially, and psychologically.
In addition to Rwandans' displeasure with the domestic courts' speed of
adjudication, a number of citizens dislike the courts' due process procedures
because they render much important evidence inadmissible.76 Moreover, some
Rwandans view the requirement that victims testify, subjecting themselves to
cross-examination, as harmful because it forces victims to relive their traumas.77
Particularly disconcerting is the distrust among Hutus of the Tutsi-controlled legal
system, which hinders the development of a reliable record of the past and harms
67. Daly, supra note 4, at 369.
68. Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14; but see, e.g., Drumbl, supra note
51, at 45; Zorbas, supra note 18, at 36. These sources more conservatively estimate that it would take
more than a century to prosecute all suspects in the traditional court system.
69. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 115.
70. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 45.
71. BALL, supra note 2, at 183.
72. Id. In 2000, there were only sixty lawyers in private practice in Rwanda and few wanted to
represent genocide suspects. Even if there were enough lawyers to represent everyone, the country
could not afford to pay for their representation. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, REPLY TO AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL'S REPORT: RWANDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE (2000)
http://www.gov.rw/govemment/06 1100news.ai.htm. (last visited March 20, 2008) [hereinafter




76. Drumbl, supra note 51, at 51-52.
77. Id.
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the reconciliation process.78 For the above reasons, many Rwandans and
international observers are displeased with the domestic courts.
C. The Military Tribunal of Rwanda
Although Organic Law No. 08/96 appears to apply to all Rwandans, "the
Military Tribunal tries in the first instance all offences committed by all Military
personnel irrespective of their rank."7 9 The tribunal also possesses "powers to try
Military personnel accused of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity
committed in Rwanda between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, that place
them in the first category irrespective of their ranks." °80  Therefore, military
personnel benefit because the government protects them from prosecution in both
the criminal courts and gacaca.
Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 81 receive preferential
treatment because "the RPF is the party in power, [hence] its armed forces are
considered military personnel retroactively, whereas the armed forces and militia
of the Habyarimana regimes are considered genocidaires."82 As a result of their
privileged status, even though the RPF engaged in the killing of an estimated
twenty-five thousand to forty-five thousand Hutu civilians during and after the
genocide, hardly any RPF members have been prosecuted.8 3 As of late 2002, the
military court had tried only twenty cases of "vengeance killings" in which an RPF
member was accused of participating in Hutu revenge killings.84 More shocking
was the fact that the chief military prosecutor had no more open files on the 1994
war crimes by November 2002.85 While the Rwandan government, which is
primarily controlled by Tutsis, has no problem with these distinctions, 86 other
Rwandans believe "[t]his furthers the notion of victor's justice as those in the RPF,
78. Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J.
DisP. RESOL. 355, 375 (2005).
79. Organic Law No. 07/2004, Determining the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of
Courts, April 25, 2004, art. 138, available at http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/jurisdictionofcourts.htm.
80. Id.; see also Constitution of the republic of Rwanda, arts. 154-55 (June 4, 2003), available in
French at http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2729.pdf (stating that the military tribunal has jurisdiction
over crimes committed by members of the military).
81. The Rwandan Patriotic Front is a group of Tutsi exiles that formed on October 1, 1990 to
combat the Hutu controlled government of President Habyarimana. E.g., Marie Beatrice Umutesi, Is
Reconciliation Between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?, 60 J. INT'L AFF. 157, 157 (2006).
82. Alana Erin Tiemessen, After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 8 AFR. STUD.
Q. 57, 70 Fall 2004.
83. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (2006).
84. Id. at 60.
85. Id.
86. The RPF has not only alienated itself from the Hutu population of Rwanda, but also from
many Tutsis. This is because many of the RPF who grew up as Tutsi exiles in foreign countries learned
to speak English rather than French, which has caused a strained relationship with Rwanda's
Francophone Tutsi population. Some of the complaints Tutsis have voiced since the genocide are: (1)
the reintegration of suspected genocidaires into government and the military; (2) the government's
public display of bones and corpses to memorialize the genocide; and (3) the lack of reparations for
survivors. Id. at 37.
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as Tutsis, will not stand trial against accusations from primarily Hutu
communities."8 7
D. Foreign Tribunals of Universal Jurisdiction
A handful of Rwandans have been tried in Switzerland and Belgium based
upon the implementation of universal jurisdiction. 8 In 1999, Switzerland tried a
former Rwandan mayor and found him guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention. 9 It became the first nation to employ its domestic courts to judge a
case where neither the perpetrator nor the victims were citizens of the nation and
where the crime occurred outside the country's borders. 90 Following Switzerland,
Belgium convicted four Rwandans of violations of the Geneva Convention. 9'
However, in 2003, Belgium amended its universal jurisdiction law, severely
limiting its reach, but preserving one Rwandan case that had already begun. 92 In
2005, that case led to the trial of two Rwandan businessmen implicated in mass
murder. 93 Although these trials have gained international attention, their impact in
Rwanda has been extremely limited because they affect only a handful of
Rwandans living in exile in the countries that choose to prosecute.
94
III. THE GACACA COURTS
A. Historical Development of Gacaca
Given the problems with the ICTR and the national courts, on October 17,
1998, the Rwandan president, in conjunction with officials and citizens,
established a commission to expedite justice and increase public participation in
the process. 95  On June 8, 1999, the Commission published a proposal for
gacaca.96 Legislation enacting gacaca passed on January 26, 2001 . Gacaca, in
Kinyarwandan (the local language), means "the grassy lawn," and it refers to a
traditional dispute resolution mechanism used by communities in Rwanda. 9' The
government turned to gacaca as an alternative to the traditional courts because of
citizens' familiarity with the system and its ability to engage all Rwandans in the
87. Tiemessen, supra note 82 at 70.
88. William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the 'Crime of
Crimes,' I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 39, 47 (2003) [hereinafter Schabas, National Courts].
89. Id.
90. Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Belgian Genocide Trial, Apr. 12, 2001,
http://hrw.org/press/2001/04/rwanda-trial.htm. [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Rwanda].
91. Schabas, National Courts, supra note 88.
92. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, Aug. 1, 2003,
http://hrw.org/English/docs/2003/08/01/ belgiu6280.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Belgium].
93. Associated Press, Two on Trial for Rwanda Genocide, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 10,
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/10/rwanda.
94. See Human Rights Watch, Rwanda, supra note 90.
95. Raper, supra note 16, at 33.
96. Id. at 33-34.
97. Id. at 34.
98. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 355 n. 1.
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process of accounting for a genocide that involved mass societal participation. 99
National implementation of gacaca began in 2006.00
Rwanda designed gacaca to work in combination with the national criminal
courts by enabling gacaca to handle crimes committed between October 1, 1990
and December 31, 1994, and by adopting the same four categories of genocide
suspects as contained in Organic Law 08/96.101 Category 1 suspects (leaders and
organizers of the genocide, notorious murderers, and those who committed sexual
torture) continued to face prosecution in the criminal courts, while suspects in
Categories 2, 3, and 4 were within gacaca's jurisdiction. 1
02
In October 2001, over 260,000 judges were elected from the community103 to
preside over 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions.I0 4 Beginning in 2002, a two year pilot
phase of gacaca commenced, in which only 751 jurisdictions operated. 0 5 At the
end of the pilot phase, in June 2004, the law's complexity and system inefficiency
led lawmakers to revise gacaca.10 6  The current gacaca law contains only three
categories of suspects: Category 1 remains the same; Category 2 combines all
perpetrators and accomplices of murder and other violent crimes; and Category 3
applies to those suspected of property offenses. 10 7  The law establishes a three-
tiered court system: the Cell handles Category 3 crimes, the Sector handles
Category 2 crimes, and the Gacaca Court of Appeal handles appeals from those
sentenced in absentia or sentenced by the Sector.'0 8 Furthermore, the law reduces
the number of judges required at the Cell level from nineteen to fifteen, and lowers
the overall number of judges required from 260,000 to 170,000.109 Despite the
99. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Context or Historical Background of Gacaca
Courts,http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) [hereinafter
Historical Background].
100. Godwin Agaba, Gacaca Courts to Change Structure, THE NEW TIMES (Kigali), Jan. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id-article=3978.
101. See Organic Law, No. 40/2000, Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions
for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, Jan. 26, 2001, arts. 3 & 51, available at www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf.
102. Id. at arts. 2, 39-42. Originally gacaca had four jurisdictions, arranged hierarchically like the
court system, to handle the various levels of suspects: the Cell handled Category 4 crimes; the Sector
handled Category 3 crimes; the District handled Category 2 crimes; and the Province handled appeals of
sentences from the District and sentences rendered in absence of the accused.
103. BEIGBEDER, supra note 6, at 115.
104. Sarah L. Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 14 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 167, 174 (2005).
105. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 380.
106. Id. at 378.
107. See Organic Law, No. 16/2004, Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning
of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and
Other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, June
19, 2004, art. 51, available at www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlawl.pdf [hereinafter, Organic Law,
No. 16/2004].
108. See id. at arts. 41-43.
109. See id. at art. 13; William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 879, 894 (2005) [hereinafter Schabas, Genocide Trials].
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2004 reduction in the number of judges necessary for gacaca, low judicial
participation has led the Executive Secretary of the National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions (NSGC), Domitille Mukantanganzwa, to propose a law in parliament
to further reduce the number of judges required by almost half.110
Notwithstanding the major changes NSGC has made to gacaca law, many
Rwandans remain skeptical of gacaca's ability to provide an effective method to
adjudicate genocide suspects.
B. The Objectives of Gacaca
The government instituted gacaca to achieve the following five objectives: (1)
"[t]o reveal the truth about what has happened;" (2) "[t]o speed up the genocide
trials;" (3) "[t]o eradicate the culture of impunity;" (4) "[t]o reconcile the
Rwandans and reinforce their unity;" and (5) "[tlo prove that Rwandan society has
the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice based on the
Rwandan custom."" 1
From the government's perspective, these goals are fundamental to effective
adjudication of genocide suspects. The government continues to champion gacaca
as a success,"2 even though gacaca has hardly achieved the five objectives it
purports to address. Rather than generating solutions, gacaca has created more
problems for Rwandan society to solve, which forces people to question whether
the government is addressing the right goals with gacaca and whether the
objectives it has established can be achieved through the current gacaca system.
1. To Reveal the Truth About What Has Happened
The official Rwandan government website states that "justice can become true
only if the truth about events is established." '13  The government asserts that
gacaca will forward the process of uncovering the truth by providing eyewitnesses
the opportunity to speak about the genocide and by developing lists of individuals
in each community who were genocide victims or participants. 114 Unlike
traditional criminal trials, in which the goal is to prosecute an individual for the
crimes he committed against the state and where the focus of the trial remains on
the defendant, gacaca focuses on the effect of the suspect's actions on the
community and invites testimony from every person affected by the crime.
Moreover, each local community has its own gacaca tribunal, increasing the
chances of societal participation in the justice process by enabling convenient
access to hearings.
While there is real potential for gacaca to provide a more complete picture of
what transpired during genocide, the search for truth is rife with obstacles. One of
the most lauded aspects of gacaca is the plea bargaining system. The system
110. Agaba, supra note 100.
111. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, The Objectives of the Gacaca Courts,
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm (last visited April 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Objectives].
112. See, e.g., Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14.
113. Objectives, supra note 111.
114. Id.
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provides for a 50% reduction in prison time for Category 2 suspects who confess
during gacaca.l15 Additionally, if a person confesses prior to his gacaca hearing,
his sentence may be reduced by up to two thirds.' 1 6 A valid confession requires a
suspect to provide a detailed description of the committed offenses, reveal all
accomplices in the crime, and publicly apologize for the offense. 117
Although public confessions could lead to uncovering the truth, the majority
of confessions made in pilot programs have not provided full disclosure of
people's participation in the genocide." 8 Requiring suspects who confess to
incriminate their accomplices pressures some suspects into falsely accusing
others."19 However, the most common problem is that almost all confessors admit
to only one or two minor crimes and blame third parties for the more serious
crimes.120 This is done to avoid harsher sentences, placement in Category 1, and
adjudication in the criminal courts. 121 Even those who admit to murder minimize
their involvement in the genocide. 122 Gabriel Gabiro, a Rwandan journalist, states,
"I've never heard anybody confessing to more than one murder. You'd think
nobody in Rwanda killed twice."' 123  It is estimated that between 250,000 and
500,000 women were raped during the genocide; 124 however, out of 1,881
confessions made in the province of Ginkogoro, no one confessed to rape, a
Category 1 crime. 125
Similar to the disincentives suspects possess for complete confession,
witnesses face pressure not to disclose what they have seen. Rather than
encouraging observers of genocide to come forward and testify, gacaca has
silenced many of them because they too face criminal liability for failing to render
assistance to genocide victims. 126  Several survivors believe that people talked
more openly about the genocide prior to gacaca, when they did not fear jail time. 1
27
In addition to rapists refusing to confess and witnesses refusing to come
forward, the victims of rape are highly unlikely to testify. 128 A 2002 study, by the
Rwandan Unity and Reconciliation Commission, found that 60% of sexual abuse
survivors forecasted that women would testify much less than men because of the
115. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 73.
116. Ali Mao, Traditional Justice, NEW VISION (UGANDA), Dec. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
21382971.
117. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 54.
118. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 72-73.
119. Zorbas, supra note 18, at 36-37.
120. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 140.
121. Id.
122. See Stephan Fais, Open Court, 165 TIME EUROPE 12, Mar. 21, 2005, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1037615,00.html.
123. Id.
124. Wells, supra note 104, at 182.
125. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 115.
126. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 81. The 2001 gacaca provision, which provided immunity to
bystanders from criminal liability, was deleted in the 2004 gacaca law.
127. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 74.
128. Wells, supra note 104, at 187.
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intimate nature of the crime. 129 According to Gaudelive Mukasavais, a Rwandan
social worker:
At first women who were raped used to testify, but nowadays they don't
want to because nothing happened after their testimony. No one helped
them. That's why it is difficult to tell these women that they should tell
it to their neighbors during Gacaca, neighbors who have no training and
who cannot help them with their trauma. We tell them to testify but
most are not willing.
130
While many survivors worry that if they tell the truth they might suffer
violence, ostracism or counter-allegations that they committed crimes, the risks of
testifying for rape survivors are much higher. 131 In Rwanda, rape victims fear they
will become ineligible to marry and will face ostracism from their families and
husbands. 132 Frequently, parents refuse to allow young girls to testify because of a
commonly held belief that discussing sexual abuse will only worsen ethnic tension
and harm the reconciliation process. 
133
Victims are also reluctant to testify because they fear for their own safety. 34
To reduce the fears associated with testifying, gacaca judges possess the ability to
imprison anyone who threatens or pressures a witness not to testify. 135 In March
2004, fourteen people were sentenced to death and three to life imprisonment for
killing survivors expected to testify in gacaca. 136 However, this has not stopped
the threatening or killing of survivors and witnesses. Between July and December
2006, there were at least 16 killings and 24 attempted killings of witnesses.'
37
Several of the murdered individuals were executed with machete, 138 the same farm
tool used to carry out the genocide.
The biggest challenge to obtaining the truth is getting both sides to participate
and believe in gacaca. While a Johns Hopkins survey found that 87% of the
population was willing to provide evidence in gacaca,139 this statistic is unreliable
129. Id.
130. Internews Rwanda, Child of Rape: Child of Genocide, Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.intemews.org.rw/articles7.htm#child.
131. Wells, supra note 104, at 186-88.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 391.
135. See Organic Law, No. 16/2004, supra note 107, at art. 30. These prison sentences can range
from three months to two years.
136. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 392.
137. Karen McVeigh, Spate of Killings Obstructs Rwanda's Quest for Justice, THE OBSERVER,
Dec. 3, 2006, at 41, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/03/rwanda.karenmcveigh.
One particularly gruesome story is of Martin Havugivaremye who testified in front of gacaca. When
Mr. Havugivaremye was attacked with machetes he called out for help, but no one in his village would
assist him because he had given the names of killers in gacaca. These murders have also been
perpetrated against gacaca judges.
138. Id.
139. SIMON GASIBIREGE AND STELLA BABALOLA, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GACACA LAW IN
RWANDA: EVIDENCE FROM A MULTI-METHOD STUDY 14 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health,
Ctr. for Commc'n Programs, 2001).
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because although people's words support gacaca, their actions do not. 
140 In two
pilot programs studied, only genocide survivors accused people of committing
crimes, with one exception. 14 1 Initially, Hutus in both communities remained
silent during gacaca hearings. 142 However, in Gatovu, as gacaca progressed, the
Hutu population began defending the accused, fighting with survivors and calling
them liars. 143 In Vumwe, Hutus stopped going to assemblies and by the end of the
observation, only 10% of the community attended hearings. 144 Throughout fifteen
cases, only seventeen people in the community testified, other than the
defendants. 145
The government's control over gacaca further obstructs the process of
uncovering a truthful version of the genocide because the government forwards its
own version of truth and ignores voices in the community. 146  Because the
majority of the government is run by the RPF (the group of Tutsis responsible for
ending genocide), massacres performed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)
(the military wing of the RPF) are not addressed in gacaca, even though gacaca
law enables adjudication of crimes against humanity. 147 As a result, many Hutus
and outside observers believe gacaca is a form of victor's justice, portraying all
Hutus as perpetrators of genocide and all Tutsis as faultless victims. 14 This one-
sided version of the genocide is only capable of providing half-truths.
Another obstacle to discovering the truth is many villagers' fundamental lack
of trust in gacaca, which has led some of them to abuse the gacaca system by using
the pretence of genocide accusations to settle land disputes and family feuds.
149
"By failing to provide an adequate forum for hearing property disputes, the
government may have unwittingly encouraged people to try to resolve those
disputes through false accusations of genocide in gacaca."' 50  Even without
purposeful deception, many survivor accounts are inaccurate because survivors
were hiding or fleeing and did not witness the event in question, or because they no
longer have a clear memory of the event due to the trauma they suffered during
genocide. 151
While gacaca has expanded the opportunities for truth and healing by
enabling survivors to share their stories and by requiring suspects to give
confessions to detail their crimes, it has had limited success. Gacaca is unable to
140. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 73-74.
141. Id. at 105.
142. Id. at 105-06.
143. Id. at 106.
144. Id. at 103.
145. Id. at 106.
146. See Tiemessen, supra note 82, at 58.
147. Id. at 69-70.
148. See id. at 67-69.
149. Paul Willis, No Lawyers but Rwanda's Village Courts Could Pass Death Sentence, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5967489. In the Ginkongoro province, a
man was falsely accused of rape during gacaca because he owed the alleged victim's family money.
150. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 72.
151. Id. at 71.
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produce truthful accounts of the past because both suspects and victims are
reluctant to invest in the system.
2. To Speed Up the Genocide Trials
When gacaca began, the government guaranteed that gacaca would speed up
the adjudication of genocide suspects because, rather than having only twelve
specialized courts, the country would have 11,000 gacaca jurisdictions to handle
genocide crimes. 152 However, during the first six years of gacaca, it appeared that
it was no better equipped than the criminal courts to quicken the pace of
adjudication.
Although gacaca passed into law in January 2001, elections for gacaca judges
did not begin until October of 2001.153 The first pilot program began in June of
2002 with twelve gacaca jurisdictions. 154 By November, 2003, there were only
750 pilot programs, 155 even though the government's plan would eventually lead
to the creation of 12,100 gacaca courts. 156  On March 10, 2005, the first pilot
gacaca programs finally moved from the investigative stage (involving collection
of data and categorization of crimes) to the trial stage. 157 The first four months of
trials from March 10, 2005 to June 30, 2005 produced only 1,950 judgments. 58
Finally, in mid-July 2006, gacaca courts were extended to the whole country.15 9
At the end of October 2006, it appeared that it would take many years to
conclude gacaca because the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGC)
estimated that there were 766,489 genocide suspects whose cases had not been
adjudicated. 160  However, on December 19, 2006, the Rwandan Minister of
Justice, Mr. Tharcisse Karugarama, declared that the gacaca tribunals would
conclude by the end of 2007.161 This appeared to be an unrealistic goal because at
the beginning of 2007, approximately 40,000 accused had been tried in gacaca
courts. 162 Additionally, the mandatory weekly gacaca meetings were placing an
152. The Republic of Rwanda, supra note 14.
153. Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 896,
914 (2005).
154. Schabas, Genocide Trials, supra note 109, at 894.
155. Id. at 893-94.
156. England, supra note 55.
157. See Gacaca. Prime Minister Testifies, INTERNEWS: RWANDA ARTICLES, Apr. 2005,
http://www.intemews.org.rw/articles7.htm#prime.
158. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda/Gacaca- Over 2000 Cases Completed by Gacaca Courts,
HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Sept. 7, 2005,
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/LookupUriEnglish/8B6CF68B52AFF9F443257075
0 0 2 1 D6A8?O
penDocument.
159. Agaba, supra note 100.
160, Id. Of these suspects, 72,539 of them were placed in Category I and were to receive criminal
trials; whereas, the 397,103 suspects in Category 2 and the 296,847 in Category 3 were to receive
gacaca hearings.
161. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: RwandalGacaca- Conclusion of Gacaca Trials Next Year
(Rwandan Minister of Justice), HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 20, 2006,
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/
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economic strain on both community members 163 and judges 164 and it appeared that
gacaca courts could not sustain their current pace of adjudication. Furthermore,
rather than decreasing the number of genocide suspects, gacaca resulted in a huge
increase in suspects. 1
65
Despite the factual data from 2006 that pointed to an end date for gacaca
many years into the future, on November 19, 2007, the President of Rwanda, Paul
Kagame, announced that gacaca would conclude at the end of 2007.166
Miraculously, according to the National Service of Gacaca Courts (SNJG), more
than 800,000 suspects had been tried in gacaca courts by the end of 2007.167 The
remarkable speed with which the gacaca courts operated in 2007 is almost
unbelievable. Gacaca proceedings remain poorly documented, leaving it difficult
to ascertain how so many cases were resolved in such a short amount of time.
However, it is clear that this radically quickened pace of adjudication raises
concerns regarding whether the courts exercised procedural fairness and engaged
in sufficient community participation.
Regardless of the President's statement that gacaca would conclude at the end
of 2007, gacaca continues in 2008.168 According to Domitille Mukantanganzwa,
approximately 15% of Category 3 suspects and 3% of Category 2 suspects are still
awaiting hearings by the gacaca courts. 169 Additionally, it is possible that gacaca
courts will begin trying Category 1 genocide suspects. 170 Currently, the Rwandan
government's plan is to devote 2008 to completing gacaca.171
Although gacaca began very slowly, the Rwandan government kept its
promise to speed up the genocide trials. While the Rwandan government may see
this as a triumph, it is difficult to imagine that a country with a population of
163. Hirondelle News Agency, Stunned by Growing Numbers of Genocide Suspects, Rwanda
Revisits Categorisation, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Sept. 7, 2005, http://tj-
forum.org/archives/Gacaca%20numbers,%200ct%2005.html [hereinafter Hirondelle, Rwanda Revisits
Categorisation].
164. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 102. Judges receive no compensation for their participation in
gacaca, which has led to the common sentiment, aptly expressed by one judge that, "[i]f you didn't eat,
you cannot come to gacaca, but you must go and find some money or food. Should my children or me
die because of gacaa?... They don't give us anything[.]"
165. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda/Gacaca: Approximately a Million People Have Appeared
Before Gacaca Courts, HIRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY, Dec. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1357/461/. The Rwandan government now estimates
that around one million people participated in the genocide and require gacaca hearings. This greatly
increased number of suspects is the result of gacaca's confession system which requires all genocidaires
to name their accomplices. See Schabas, Genocide Trials, supra note 109, at 881.
166. President Paul Kagame, Address at the ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in Kigali (Nov. 19,
2007), available at http://www.acp-eu.gov.rw/index.php?iro=news&obj=39&details=235.
167. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: Controversial Assessment of the Gacaca Courts,
HiRONDELLE PRESS AGENCY,Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1394/309/.
168. See id.
169. Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: Gacaca Trials Could Also Try First Category Defendants,
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approximately 9 million people 172 was able to fairly adjudicate over 700,000
genocide suspects in one year173 when only 40,000 had been tried in the previous
six years.174 The decision to adjudicate so many suspects in such a short amount
of time may ultimately prove to be an unwise choice.
3. To Eradicate the Culture of Impunity
Many Rwandans believe that a culture of impunity exists in Rwanda because
perpetrators of prior massacres in the country received impunity. 175 Some
Rwandans believe that if this culture of impunity did not exist, the 1994 genocide
would not have occurred. 17 6 The government claims to support an end to the
culture of impunity:
In their cells, the citizens will play an important role in the
reconstruction of the facts and in the accusation of those who
perpetrated them. None of those who took part in them will escape
punishment. Thus, people will understand that the infringement implies
the punishment for the criminal without exception. 177
Rwanda has been successful at punishing Hutu genocidaires because the
country has refused to grant amnesty to most suspects and gacaca provides prison
sentences for any genocide participant who committed a more severe crime than
property damage. However, the government has not truly ended impunity because
of its refusal to try RPA soldiers responsible for committing crimes against
humanity. Additionally, crimes that the government acknowledges RPA soldiers
have committed are tried behind closed doors in front of a military tribunal run by
their peers. 17 Without publicly addressing the crimes committed by both sides,
gacaca is little more than victor's justice.
4. To Reconcile the Rwandans and Reinforce Their Unity
The government believes that gacaca will unify the nation by producing
truth. 179 As the government explains, once "the truth will be known, there will be
no more suspicion, the author will be punished, justice will be done to the victim
and to the innocent prisoner who will be reintegrated into Rwandan society."'"8
Unfortunately, gacaca is unable to produce a completely truthful version of the
genocide; and successful reconciliation will require much more than the truth.
172. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: RWANDA, June
2007, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm [hereinafter Background Note: R.wanda].
173. Hirondelle, Rwanda Revisits Categorization supra note 163.
174. Hirondelle, Conclusion of Gacaca Trials supra note 161.
175. Stephanie Wolters, The Gacaca Process: Eradicating the culture of impunity in Rwanda?
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, Aug. 5, 2005, 12, available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/iss-rwa-05aug.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Objectives, supra note 111.
178. See Tiemessen, supra note 82, at 61-68.
179. Objectives, supra note 111.
180. Id.
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There is much scholarly debate over defining reconciliation. To require
"apology and forgiveness and the willingness to embark on a new relationship
based on acceptance and trust"''8 as part of reconciliation, may automatically
prevent its achievement because in a society that has experienced such mass
atrocity, these goals may be unachievable. Professor Louis Kreisberg provides a
more practical definition of reconciliation, one that Rwandans can realistically
achieve: "Reconciliation refers to the process by which parties that have
experienced an oppressive relationship or destructive conflict with each other
move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally
acceptable."'' 8 2  Kreisberg's definition of reconciliation accurately reflects most
Rwandans' view of reconciliation, as "the way to overcome a history of conflict
and to rebuild better social relations in which people cooperate, share meals, and
drink beer together."' 8 3 For Rwandans to cooperate, to share food and drink, and
to forward national reconstruction, they must achieve "minimally acceptable"
social relations. 184
Sadly, reconciliation remains a distant hope. In pilot studies, gacaca created
more divisiveness than communal bonds.' 85 Many survivors perceive confessions
by genocide suspects as insincere,' 8 6 promoting resentment between Hutus and
Tutsis rather than reconciliation. As Klaas de Jonge, a monitor of gacaca for Penal
Reform International, stated, "[t]he accused think because they ask for forgiveness,
they are entitled to forgiveness. You hear these people confessing as if they are
describing a movie. There's absolutely no compassion."'' 8 7 Although genocide
suspects are the ones on trial, many survivors feel that the community is judging
them. As explained by one survivor, "the population dislikes you and says that
you accuse people of their family. When I encounter them on the road, they ignore
me.... Even when I want to buy beer for other people, they will refuse because
they are afraid that I will poison them."' 88  While many survivors experience
community ostracism, many perpetrators are afraid of community responses to
their actions during genocide.
An increasing problem, not documented until 2005, has been a string of
suicides and suicide attempts by genocide suspects.1 89 Between March and the end
181. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 32 (quoting Wendy Lambourne, Justice and Reconciliation:
Postconflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE AND
COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 322 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001)).
182. Id. at 31 (quoting Louis Kreisberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence", in RECONCILIATION,
JUSTICE AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 47-64, 48 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001)).
183. Id. at 33.
184. In traditional gacaca, drinking of beer together was an aspect of reconciliation, in which the
losing party was required to provide beer to the community. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 49.
185. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 91.
186. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 73.
187. Id. (quoting Interview with Klaas de Jonge, Penal Reform International, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Sept. 2002)).
188. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 134.
189. Craig Timberg, Suicides Slow Search for Justice, Closure in Rwanda, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 17, 2006. Front, available at 2006 WLNR 2911892. Some means by which genocide
suspects have killed or attempted to kill themselves include hanging oneself, ingestion of pesticide, and
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of December, 2005, sixty-nine suspects killed themselves and forty-four others
attempted suicide. 190 Some genocide survivors view the suicides as dashing their
hopes for closure. 191 Benoit Kaboyi, executive director of Ibuka, the largest
association of genocide survivors, expresses a commonly held sentiment of
survivors, that "[n]o person has the right to punish themselves.... They
[perpetrators] have to suffer for what they have done."'192 Citizens' anger toward
suspects, who killed themselves, rather than truthfully accounting for their
participation in the genocide, is a further impediment to reconciliation.
Reconciliation is a long process that may take decades or generations to
achieve. However, it has been fourteen years since the genocide, and post-gacaca
Rwanda still lacks signs that the country is moving toward unity. Rwandans must
recognize the following if they want successful reconciliation: (1) different people
have very different understandings of reconciliation; (2) reconciliation only occurs
if the two parties can openly discuss their differences and accept the reconciliation
process; and (3) reconciliation cannot be achieved until a society has peace and
personal security.' 93 Unfortunately, none of these factors have been properly
addressed by the Rwandan government.
Due to the government's top-down implementation of gacaca, members of
society had no influence over the goals of gacaca or discussions concerning
reconciliation and its significance to different groups within Rwanda.
Reconciliation has been difficult to achieve because there is no mutually held
understanding of what it means. When Rwandans were asked to define elements
of reconciliation, their answers varied widely, from confession and forgiveness, the
release of innocent prisoners, justice and uncovering the truth, to holding both
Tutsis and Hutus responsible for their crimes. 
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Another obstacle to reconciliation is gacaca's failure to produce full
disclosure of the truth. Inability to fully and openly discuss the genocide prevents
reconciliation because Hutus and Tutsis remain skeptical of each other.
Furthermore, Rwandans do not fully accept the gacaca process because their
participation is mandated by the state and they face criminal sanctions if they
refuse to comply. 195  Gacaca lacks credibility because it is not an accurate
representation of traditional gacaca and many Rwandans perceive it to be a foreign
system thrust upon their communities. 196 Additionally, many Hutus do not accept
the reconciliation process because it is government controlled, which has resulted
in a failure to address Tutsi crimes. 
197
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Furthermore, although the genocide is over, many people do not feel
personally secure. Continued violations of human rights in prisons, and the anger
of many Hutus toward the government's imprisonment of them and/or their family
without trial (or even charges for some)' 98 makes the Rwandan majority unwilling
to trust the reconciliation process. These Hutus fear that gacaca's retributive
emphasis will result in more prison time for them or their loved ones.
Lastly, there is little incentive for Rwandans to invest in the designated
reconciliation process. Although gacaca promises to provide victims with
financial compensation from the accused, 199 no compensation has been
provided.2 °0 While the government's plea bargaining system requires perpetrators
who confess to perform community service, it has not created adequate measures
to monitor people's performance of this service.20 ' When 1,676 people were asked
what they perceived the major current problems were in Rwanda, 81.9% of them
identified poverty/economic hardship as a main concern.20 2 Without providing
victims with material benefits through compensation or community service, there
exists little reason to invest in gacaca. Reconciliation remains possible for
Rwandans; however, it is unattainable under the current gacaca system.
5. To Prove That Rwandan Society Has the Capacity to Settle Its Own
Problems Through a System Based on the Rwandan Custom
Allegedly, gacaca reflects the historical dispute resolution mechanism
employed for centuries in Rwanda. However, other than a shared name, modem
gacaca barely resembles traditional gacaca. Traditionally, Rwandans used gacaca
to resolve minor disputes, such as land/property disputes and petty thefts.20 3
Gacaca had no written rules and was conducted on an ad hoc basis when disputes
arose.20 4  Reconciliation was the primary focus of gacaca; therefore, sentences
were purely compensatory 20 5 and could not be imposed without acceptance by
both parties.20 6 The system inflicted penalties on the entire family of the accused
because gacaca was based on an assumption of collective responsibility.2 7
Customarily, elder male heads of family acted as arbitrators and women were
excluded from the process. 20 8 Gacaca shunned the use of law to resolve conflicts
and deemed confessions to be a form of provocation. 20 9 Voluntary participation by
198. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 71.
199. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra note 107, art. 95.
200. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 47.
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Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 31, 55 (2002).
202. GASIBIREGE AND BABALOLA, supra note 139, at 7.
203. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 78, at 376-77.
204. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 13.
205. Id. at 14.
206. Jennifer G. Riddell, Addressing Crimes Against International Law: Rwanda's Gacaca in
Practice 48 (2005) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Aberdeen) (available at
http://www.restorativejustice.org/resources/docs/ridelljennifer).
207. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 14.
208. Fierens, supra note 153, at 913; Molenaar, supra note 7, at 12.
209. Fierens, supra note 153, at 913.
2008
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
members of society was crucial to gacaca and to resolving local disputes based on
the best interests of the community.210
The only key feature of modem gacaca that remains similar to traditional
211gacaca is a highly accessible system, based on community participation.
Otherwise, the modem gacaca framework barely resembles its namesake. All
people over twenty-one years of age, regardless of their gender, can now serve as
judges and participate in the gacaca process.212 Modem gacaca is a legal
institution that meets at regularly scheduled intervals, no longer provides
flexibility, and does not allow individual communities the independence to select
their method of implementing dispute resolution.213 Rather than using social
pressure to convince members of society to participate in the process, modem
gacaca relies on the coercive power of the state.2 14 Punishment is legislated by the
state, not based on compromise between the parties involved.21 5 Additionally,
gacaca now focuses on retribution and judges possess the ability to imprison
individuals.2 16 Furthermore, while traditional gacaca disdained confessions,
modem gacaca promotes plea bargaining as an effective tool for discovering the
truth.
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One of the government's central justifications for gacaca is that it empowers
communities to adjudicate crimes perpetrated by community members against their
neighbors.2 1 8However, the make-up of the communities that existed during
genocide has greatly changed. One reason for the change has been the influx of
approximately 750,000 Tutsi exiles into Rwanda after the genocide and the exodus
of many Hutus. 219  Additionally, Rwanda's villagization program has relocated
hundreds of thousands of people into new villages from hillside farms. 22 0 These
people were not a community during genocide and may not feel connected to each
other.22! While a central goal of traditional gacaca was to restore communities to
their condition before the conflict, it is impossible for modem gacaca to do this
because many of these communities never existed.
210. Maureen E. Laflin, Gacaca Courts: The Hope For Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the
Rwandan Genocide, 46 ADVOC. (IDAHO) 19, 20 (2003).
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214. See Waldorf, supra note 83, at 68 (explaining that methods the State has employed to coerce
participation in gacaca include threatening fines and imprisonment to people who were absent from
gacaca, closing up shops and rounding people up for gacaca, and preventing people from leaving once a
session begins).
215. Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 No. 3 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 15, 17 (2001).
216. Molenaar, supra note 7, at 25.
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218. See Donald L. Hafner Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional
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IV. THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROTECTIONS FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN GACACA COURTS
Several scholars have shied away from using the word court to refer to gacaca
because it lacks many of the due process protections that courts provide, and
because traditional gacaca was solely an arbitration system. However, the
Rwandan government refers to "Gacaca Courts, 222 and the law implementing
gacaca confirms that "Gacaca Courts have competences similar to those of
ordinary courts.... ,,223 Like court systems, gacaca's organization is hierarchical; it
has the power to summon witnesses, issue search warrants, confiscate goods,
pronounce prison sentences, and consider appeals.224
The Rwandan government labels gacaca a court, it functions like a court, and
most importantly, it possesses the power of a court to imprison individuals.
22
Therefore, if the government wants gacaca to operate as a court, it should follow
the due process requirements of a court, as enumerated in domestic law and the
international and regional treaties to which Rwanda subscribes. Failure to do so
weakens gacaca in the eyes of the local populace and the international community.
The Rwandan government agrees, and has stated, "[w]e acknowledge that Gacaca
jurisdictions are tribunals to which the international human rights instruments, to
which Rwanda is a party, apply., 226 Despite this recognition by the government,
gacaca violates several fair trial procedures provided for by international and
domestic law.
Rwanda joined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1975, the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights
(African Charter) in 1983, and signed the Arusha Peace Accord in 1993, which
incorporated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into domestic
law.227 Domestically, Rwanda provides for fair trial standards in the Rwandan
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). The ICCPR, African Charter, UDHR and
CCP all recognize an accused's right to defense counsel. 228 However, in gacaca,
the accused are not entitled to counsel. Additionally, the ICCPR and the CCP
guarantee defendants the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and call
witnesses in their own defense, neither of which is provided for in gacaca.229 The
222. Historical Background, supra note 99.
223. Organic Law No. 16/2004, supra notel07, at art. 39.
224. Id. at arts. 39, 41-43.
225. Id. at art. 39; Historical Background, supra note 99.
226. The Republic of Rwanda, Reply, supra note 72, at § X, E.
227. Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (summarizing from the Arusha Peace Accord, Art. 17 which
states, "the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 10 th of December
1948 shall take precedence over corresponding principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic
of Rwanda, especially when the latter are contrary to the former.").
228. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), art.
14(3)(b, d), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's
Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res.
217A (III), art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (citing the
Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) art. 75(1)).
229. See ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(3)(e); Werchick, supra note 215, at 16 (citing CCP art.
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government allows the prosecutor access to witnesses in developing the
evidentiary record before a hearing, but defendants do not have access to witnesses
or their files prior to hearings. 230 This appears to violate the ICCPR provision that
a defendant is entitled "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defense."23'
Key to the UDHR, ICCPR, and African Charter is the guarantee of an
impartial and independent tribunal.232  Gacaca law requires judges to be
"Rwandans of integrity" with "high morals and conduct," who have not
participated in genocide or crimes for which they received a sentence of over six
months.233 Despite these requirements, judicial impartiality and independence
remain questionable because judges are members of the community, they
experienced genocide themselves, and some have very strong biases. Gacaca
judges receive only six days of training
234 and no compensation for their work.
235
Large numbers of poorly trained, unpaid judges threaten impartiality because
judges are ripe for corruption 236 and manipulation. Moreover, judicial impartiality
clearly does not exist in all gacaca locations because 14,885 gacaca judges have
been charged with genocide. 237
Furthermore, the ICCPR and the African Charter guarantee a right to appeal
to a higher tribunal. 238 However, in gacaca all appeals are handled within the
gacaca courts and under no circumstances reach the criminal courts. As a result of
gacaca's violations of fair trial standards, enumerated in the ICCPR and African
Charter, the appeal system is inadequate.239
To counter accusations of international law violations, Rwanda claims that it
is complying with international treaties, and points to Article 4 of the ICCPR,
which states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
76(6)).
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231. ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(3)(b).
232. UDHR, supra note 228, at art. 10; ICCPR, supra note 228, at art. 14(1); African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and People's Rights, supra note 228, at art. 7 & 26.
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exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their obligations under international law....240
While the categorization of this situation as an "emergency" is debatable,
Article 4 explicitly prevents derogation of responsibilities that are inconsistent with
Rwanda's other international legal obligations. Despite the Rwandan
government's acceptance that Article 4 applies to Rwanda, the country still does
not provide the fair trial guarantees provided by international and domestic law.
Since gacaca functions as a court, and adjudicates cases with criminal sanctions,
the rules Rwandans agreed to internationally and domestically should apply.
V. LOOKING FORWARD: REVISING GACACA AND RWANDA'S GOALS FOR THE
FUTURE
At the outset of gacaca many scholars supported the system because they
believed it was better than the alternatives. The ICTR was limited to only a select
few Rwandans; those identified as the masterminds of the genocide. The criminal
justice system, which originally intended to prosecute all genocide suspects (not
tried by the ICTR), was incapable of timely prosecution. Scholars supported
gacaca, even though it was rife with due process violations, because they believed
in its potential to promote reconciliation.24 1 Unfortunately, the past seven years,
since gacaca's inception, demonstrate that gacaca is a failure because of several
flaws in the system's design and because of its failure to address the economic
struggles of Rwandans. There is a need for new solutions that address both the
prosecution of genocidaires and the re-growth of the economy.
A. Fundamental Flaws of Gacaca and Proposals for a New System of Justice
There are several problems with the current gacaca system. One problem is
that the government promotes gacaca as both a traditional dispute resolution
system and a court; it simultaneously attempts to provide criminal retribution and
reconciliation.242 However, it achieves neither of these goals successfully. The
uncomfortable blend of reconciliation and retribution has alienated many
Rwandans from the process.
Since its inception, the government has failed to critically examine gacaca.
Instead of acknowledging the many signs in 2006 that gacaca was not successfully
leading to truth finding and reconciliation, the government decided in 2007 to
radically speed up the adjudication process in an effort to complete gacaca by the
end of that year. When gacaca could not be completed in 2007, the government
agreed to extend the process into 2008.
In addition to its goal of concluding all Category 2 and Category 3 cases in
2008, the government is entertaining the idea of creating a National Gacaca Court
to handle Category 1 suspects.243 The government has continuously ignored the
240. The Republic of Rwanda, Reply, supra note 72.
241. See Raper, supra note 16, at 48-49.
242. See id. at 31.
243. Genocide/Gacaca- Gacaca Trials Could Also Try First Category Defendants, supra note 169.
The government discussed gacaca trying Category I suspects as early as 2005. See Edwin Musoni,
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due process problems inherent in gacaca. These due process violations are the
most worrisome aspect of the government's plan to incorporate Category 1
suspects into gacaca because Category 1 suspects are the individuals who
committed the most serious high-profile crimes, including mass murder, rape, and
torture, 244 and face the highest risks if they are not provided with criminal
procedure protections.
Despite the due process concerns, the most disturbing aspect of gacaca
remains its failure to relieve ethnic tensions or provide a truthful account of the
past. Although the majority of gacaca suspects have now been tried, it is
questionable whether they have received a fair and adequate hearing. Rather than
continuing on its rushed path toward completion of gacaca by the end of 2008, the
government should focus on establishing an appellate process within gacaca and
within the criminal court system that enables people who do not feel they received
a fair hearing to challenge their conviction. A proper appellate process may lead to
many new community hearings where the factual record has been inadequately
established or presented in a biased manner. Additionally, rather than continuing
to artificially boost a system that many Rwandans view as antithetical to
reconciliation, the Rwandan government should alter gacaca to restore community
trust in the system.
A new decentralized gacaca system should be established that more closely
resembles traditional gacaca. Unlike the current system, which relies on
government-generated lists of suspects,245 local community members should be
responsible for bringing cases forward and should be encouraged to name both
Hum and Tutsi suspects who engaged in Category 2 and Category 3 offenses
leading up to genocide, during the genocide, and in the months following the
genocide, when the RPF took control. The power to imprison individuals should
be removed from gacaca in order to promote reconciliation. Rather than RPF-
mandated prison sentences, or penalties for genocide suspects, each community
should work toward creating its own system of justice for genocide suspects. The
elimination of prison sentences would significantly reduce due process concerns
and increase the chance that genocide suspects would fully disclose their role in
the genocide.
While a more localized form of gacaca is necessary to return people's
confidence in the process, abolishing government oversight poses the risk that
some communities and suspects will not take gacaca seriously. To prevent
Rwandans from feeling that this system perpetuates the culture of impunity, the
government should retain records of all Category 2 and Category 3 suspects and
these suspects should be informed that if they commit a new offense they may face
Rwanda: Gacaca Wants to Try Category One Suspects, THE NEW TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/10791.html (stating that a plan to create a National Gacaca Court is in
the draft stage and still needs cabinet and parliament approval).
244. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, RWANDA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2006), available at
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criminal prosecution for any crimes committed during genocide,246 as well as for
their current crimes. Additionally, the government should continue criminal
prosecution of Category 1 suspects, the leaders and organizers of the genocide and
those who committed acts of rape and sexual torture.247 To ensure some modicum
of impartiality, government trained gacaca judges should continue to oversee the
gacaca process in their communities. Furthermore, the government should retain
the power to prevent communities from implementing solutions that violate the
civil rights of those found guilty. The government may also want to provide
communities with suggestions on how to develop their own solutions for resolving
cases.
Since the majority of genocide suspects have already been tried in gacaca, any
changes to gacaca must be retroactively applied. For people currently serving
prison sentences, who were found guilty in gacaca, their sentences should be
converted to community service. Each individual's local gacaca should be
responsible for determining the type of service that must be performed and
overseeing that service. The release of these prisoners into society will have a
positive effect on the economy because it will reduce Rwanda's prison costs and it
will invigorate Rwanda's workforce. Additionally, the money Rwanda currently
allocates to prisons can be given to communities to implement service programs.
B. Gacaca's Failure to Address Rwandans' Economic Hardships and Proposals
for How to Include These Concerns in the Future
Rwanda is ranked 158th out of the 175 poorest countries in the world,
according to the Human Development Index.245 It is an extremely poor country in
which 90% of its citizens rely on primary agriculture to survive.249 It is one of the
world's most densely populated agrarian societies and has a population of
approximately nine million people living in a country smaller than Maryland.25 °
246. The system would function like an unsupervised pre-trial diversion program does in the
United States. Charges are re-instituted only if the defendant commits new violating conduct. See, e.g.,
Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 318 (2001) (Procedure on Charge of Violation of Conditions of Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition Program). Because the offenses in question were committed at least fourteen
years earlier, and suspects should have an expectation of finality at some point, like the American
counterpart, charges should be dismissed after a specified period of time with no new violating conduct.
See. e.g., Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 316(B) (2001) (period of program not to exceed two years); Pa.R.Crim.P.
Rule 319 (2001) (providing for dismissal of charges upon successful completion of the program). One
exception to this time limitation may be advisable. As is the case, generally, in the United States,
homicide charges could potentially be prosecuted at any time. Cf., e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 5551 (1990)
(generally no time limit for prosecution of homicide cases).
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The main socio-economic problem is the large population and lack of access to
land. 1 Most genocide survivors are extremely poor. 2
Although the 1996 Genocide Law and the 2001 Gacaca Law called for
reparations for victims of genocide, these reparations have never been realized. 3
In 2004, the revised gacaca law deferred the issue of reparations. 4 For survivors
there are few options for receiving compensation for their losses. While some
criminal courts have awarded compensation to victims from convicted
genocidaires, most of these genocidaires are indigent and unable to pay.
2 55
Moreover, the Rwandan government has immunized itself from civil liability for
its role in the genocide.256 The only government fund for survivors is the Fonds
d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide (FARG), which provides the neediest
survivors assistance with healthcare and education costs. 257 However, this is not a
compensation fund and cannot be accessed by the gacaca or criminal courts to
award survivors reparations.258
A major impediment to gacaca has been the government's failure to address
survivor's financial needs. It is impossible for this small country with limited
financial resources to prosecute every individual who participated in genocide.
Rather than helping Rwandans to reconcile, gacaca has further divided
communities by draining the crucial financial resources 25 9 necessary for rebuilding
Rwanda and for providing reparations to genocide victims. Without economic
incentives, many survivors are less inclined to participate in gacaca.26 °
Additionally, many Rwandans are reluctant to participate in gacaca as witnesses or
judges because it means time away from their economic livelihood.26'
If the government revises gacaca as suggested, it has the potential to reduce
the economic suffering of survivors, which thus far has been ignored. Coerced
community participation in gacaca should be eliminated and replaced with
incentives created by the community to encourage local participation. Rather than
mandatory weekly meetings, in which all members of the community must attend,
each community should devise its own schedule for meetings and requirements for
community participation. Each village should create an individualized gacaca plan
that possesses the power to consider the economic strains particular to its area and
251. Country Operations Plan, supra note 248.
252. Waldorf, supra note 83, at 56.
253. Id.
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to develop community specific solutions. One method of relieving economic stress
may be found in communities' creation of penalties for people who have been
found responsible for property offenses. Some possible solutions that communities
may develop for people found liable for property offenses include community
service projects, return of property to its rightful owner, repair of property
damaged during genocide, and reparations. These punishments possess the
potential to spark economic growth.
Regardless of the possibilities gacaca possesses for empowering Rwandans to
change their future and their economy, changing Rwanda's system for adjudicating
genocide suspects is only one step in the process of reconciliation. Resources that
are no longer needed to detain and prosecute Category 2 and Category 3 suspects
should be diverted toward rebuilding the economy, creating support groups for
survivors, opening spaces for dialogue between Hutus and Tutsis, and designing
education programs that advance reconciliation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present gacaca system is not succeeding. Rather than bringing Rwandans
together, gacaca has proven divisive. Moreover, gacaca violates several fair trial
standards established by Rwanda through domestic and international law. In order
to successfully reunite and rebuild the nation, major revisions to gacaca are
necessary. However, gacaca alone will never solve Rwanda's problems.
Reconciliation is a slow process that may take decades or generations.
Whether Rwanda chooses to use national courts, gacaca, amnesty, or some
combination of these to tackle the problems associated with the genocide,
reconciliation requires more than addressing the question of what to do with the
perpetrators. As posed by one genocide survivor, "[h]ow can I forgive, when my
livelihood was destroyed and I cannot even pay for schooling for my children?,
262
Reconciliation is not possible without addressing the economic hardship suffered
as a result of genocide. Rwandans cannot move forward unless their government
addresses the physical, psychological, and social traumas that they suffered.
Genocide has not only affected the victims emotionally, it has also affected the
entire Rwandan population by causing massive economic upheaval. For too long,
the government has focused on the criminal prosecution of genocide suspects. The
end of criminal prosecution of Category 2 and Category 3 suspects will greatly
increase the resources available for poverty alleviation, job creation, and
education. It is now time for the government to place its primary focus on
rebuilding the nation.
262. Zorbas, supra note 18, at 37.
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